Introduction
It is no secret to anyone familiar with tort law that product liability has become an extensive, globally recognized area of private law. 1 The same can be said of the (in)famous development risk defence (DRD), 2 which precludes product liability whenever "the inherent risk of a defective product [is] undiscoverable at the time of supply by a manufacturer." 3 Fuelled by the desire to enhance the "long-term social good" 4 , the DRD is said to foster innovation by shielding industries from liability stemming from defective products born of research and development (R&D) in cases where the risk was not discoverable in light of accessible scientific knowledge at the time the product was put onto the market. 5 Conceptually distinct from the state-of-the-art defence 6 (which speaks the language of negligence), 7 the extension of such immunity from liability to producers Albeit relevant in the world of common law, this concept does not properly fit in the civilian tradition, where "defences" are unknown and are instead embedded in the dialectic of "fault" and its variations. I nonetheless refer to the DRD as a defence because it is a legal transplant that intervenes after a defect has been established, and as such this appears to be the least confusing approach. The defence emerged in the US at the dawn of the 1970s. Although the landmark case on this issue was Beshada v Johns-Manville Products Corp (447 A (2d) 539, 90 NJ 191 (1982) ), a stream of cases had already set the stage for it to be considered by courts. See e.g. Suter v San Angelo Foundry & Machine, 406 A (2d) 140, 81 NJ 150 (1979) (observing that "the state of the art refers not only to the common practice and standards in the industry but also to other design alternatives within practical and technological limits at the time of distribution" at 151 [cited to A (2d)]). 7 Although similar in effect, the state-of-the-art defence is linked to the subjective foreseeability of risk by the producers, while the DRD revolves around objectively evaluated knowledge. As such, the EU-style defence relates more to the type of risk than to the producer's behaviour. See Stapleton, Product Liability, supra note 4 at 225. The DRD therefore shifts away from the economic dimension embedded within the state-of-theart defence, as "total lack of experience makes it impossible to foresee such risks and to make estimates regarding the probability of accidents" (Göran Skogh, "Development amounts to a state in which victims of this type of defective product are, at best, dependent on other legal categories and causes of action in order to obtain compensation (contractual warranty, vice caché, negligence, faute, culpa, dangerous activity, etc.) or, at worst, left to themselves in a situation perhaps reminiscent of the pre-industrial caveat emptor paradigm fiercely criticized by PL scholars. 8 Despised and glorified, adopted and rejected, transplanted, transposed, and altered, much has been saidmostly in Europe 9 but also in Quebec 10 -about this immunity from liability that polarizes commentators along a left-right divide.
Risks, Strict Liability, and the Insurability of Industrial Hazards" (1998) 23:87 The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance 247 at 248). 8 The economic analysis of law (EAL) has greatly contributed to the idea that personal injury damages must be borne by the enterprises responsible for putting the product on the market. See e.g. Guido Calabresi, "Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts" (1961) 70:4 Yale LJ 499 (" [n] ot charging an enterprise with a cost which arises from it leads to an understatement of the true cost of producing its goods; the result is that people purchase more of those goods than they would want if their true cost were reflected in price" at 514). Beyond the civil law and common law divide, the exemption clause crystallizes the link between some conceptions of justice and our contemporary economy, as it suggests that too much liability chills innovation. Its features have been extensively documented, to the point that the aim of the present contribution may appear methodologically modest, as it merely seeks to provide a comparative overview of recent developments regarding the DRD, driven by expanding case law on the issue. 11 In which legal systems is the DRD to be found? A classical, horizontal comparative exercise (beyond mainstream EU/USA corresponding endeavours) allows us to map properly the territories it occupies after testifying of its projection, through vertical comparison, at the supranational level (Part I). Despite widespread adoption of the DRD, interpretations vary respecting its elements, including knowledge and its counterpart, uncertainty, which are at the very core of the defence (Part II). A comparative legal analysis provides the ability to highlight methodological and ethical concerns and ambiguity present in the DRD, while raising the delicate practice of melding law and science within the courtroom, which has long stimulated debate among evidence and causation experts. 12 Ultimately, indeed, the DRD's boundaries are set by the judiciary, although "the courtroom is not the place for scientific guesswork, even of the inspired sort," as Justice Posner once warned. 13 
I. The Territories of the Development Risk Defence
As product liability spread to many of the industrial world's legal systems, the DRD, too, marked both national and international levels. Transported by circulating policy reasons and, possibly, path dependencies, the model spread rapidly beginning in the 1960s. Intertwining legal roots make it difficult to determine whether it originated in national laws (Section B) or supranational endeavours (Section A). The following section is, therefore, merely intended to offer greater clarity.
A. Supranational Moulds and Pathways
The 1960s were characterized by the spread of product liability maximodels throughout the industrialized world, including those established in the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage (1963) Simply stated, neoliberal conceptions of the economy suggest that such a drug shall not be prescribed by any doctor (and should not, to begin with, ever be on the market).
The European Economic Community had earlier adopted the PL Directive, which defined product defect based on consumer expectations. It provides that a "product is defective when it does not provide the safety which a person is entitled to expect." 31 It draws partly on the American experience, and article 7(e) states that a producer will not be liable if "the state of scientific and technical knowledge at the time when he put the product into circulation was not such as to enable the existence of the defect to be discovered." 32 Commenting on the PL Directive in a European Court of Justice (ECJ) case, Advocate General Tesauro stated that the Council opted for a system of strict liability which was no longer absolute, but limited, in deference to a principle of the fair apportionment of risk between the injured person and the producer, the latter having to bear only quantifiable risks, but not development risks which are, by their nature, unquantifiable. 33 Bolstered by the Thatcherism then in vogue, the DRD had success in Brussels and other world capitals as well as academic endeavours. 34 The 29 Concisely, the American-born doctrine states that "manufacturers of prescription drugs have a duty to warn prescribing physicians of the drugs' known dangerous propensities, and the physicians, in turn, using their medical judgment, have a duty to convey the warnings to their patients" (Kirk "culturally neutral" language of economic sciences unsurprisingly bloomed and flourished throughout the field of product liability, justifying just about any of the forms it took, be they closer to negligence-based models or risk-distribution anchored rationales.
Although in both the EU and the US harmonization of the DRD remains optional, 35 a fundamental difference exists between the two legal systems: the rule is merely persuasive authority in the latter but becomes truly normative in the former whenever a member state avails itself of the option to adopt the DRD. 36 The EU-style DRD harmonization process requires further explanation. The integration of the DRD in the PL Directive was so controversial that the European Council was politically forced in 1985 to leave member states a discretionary margin to either adopt or reject certain features of the directive including the DRD. For example, article 15 (1) This discretionary freedom does not, however, allow member states to alter the wording of the DRD as they see fit, as the degree of harmonization versity Press, 2011) at 86 art 3:204, who proposes the following exclusion cause of liability: "A producer is particularly not liable where he can prove that the product's defect, at the point when it was marketed, did not exist or that the defect was not recognisable through the current state of science and technology at this point" [emphasis added]. The adverb "particularly" and the adjective "recognisable" reflect the novelty of Brüggemei-er's reflection. 35 For a historical account, see Lori M Linger, "The Products Liability Directive: A Mandatory Development Risks Defense" (1991) 14 Fordham Int'l LJ 478. 36 At first sight, the ECJ's interpretation may appear confusing, as total harmonization is the goal of regulations rather than directives. 37 The compromise is described as follows: "Whereas ... the [DRD] may be felt in certain Member States to restrict unduly the protection of the consumer; whereas it should therefore be possible for a Member State to maintain in its legislation or to provide by new legislation that this exonerating circumstance is not admitted" (PL Directive, supra note 5 at 30). According to Van sought is quite total given the sui generis, federal-inspired structure that now characterizes the EU. 38 The EU learned its lesson after France subordinated the application of the DRD to a post-market duty of safety (obligation de sécurité). 39 The ECJ came to the conclusion that the wording of this national measure departed from the harmonized provision in article 7(e). 40 To summarize, the ECJ held 41 that the EU Council unanimity procedure that underlies "market-driven directives" 42 erected upon article 100 of the (former) Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community 43 (among them, the PL Directive), is incompatible with a bottom-up, minimum approach, because they seek to eliminate legal divergences that "may distort competi- 41 See ibid at I-3865-69. 42 The first recital of the PL Directive states:
Whereas approximation of the laws of the Member States concerning the liability of the producer for damage caused by the defectiveness of his products is necessary because the existing divergences may distort competition and affect the movement of goods within the common market and entail a differing degree of protection of the consumer against damage caused by a defective product to his health or property (supra note 5 [emphasis added]).
As Howells rightly points out, "[p]roduct liability does not directly impose barriers to trade as it makes no specific requirement of products other than they are not defective. Thus the justification must rest upon the distortion of competition ground" (Geraint Howells, "Product Liability: A History of Harmonisation" in Fairgrieve, supra note 9, 202 at 203). The rationale laying down the DRD is even more unsatisfactory, as it suggests that "a fair apportionment of risk between the injured person and the producer implies that the producer should be able to free himself from liability if he furnishes proof as to the existence of certain exonerating circumstances" (PL Directive, supra note 5, 7th recital [emphasis added]). I have expressed doubts as to the relevancy of this assumption: "Sur le terrain de l'empirisme ... l'établissement d'un rapport de cause à effet entre la sévérité des normes de responsabilité civile et la vivacité de la recherche et du développement est étayée de preuves contradictoires. Et il n'est pas certain que la tâche qui consiste à établir cette corrélation échoit aux juristes" (Marie-Eve Arbour, "Itinéraire du risque de développement à travers des codes et des constitutions" in Benoît Moore, ed, Mélanges: Jean-Louis Baudouin (Cowansville, Que: Yvon Blais, 2012) 677 at 684 [Arbour, "Itinéraire du risque").
tion and affect the movement of goods within the common market and entail a differing degree of protection of the consumer against damage caused by a defective product to his health or property." 44 Rather, the ECJ concluded that "the margin of discretion available to the Member States in order to make provision for product liability is entirely determined by the Directive itself and must be inferred from its wording, purpose and structure." 45 Hence, it held that the discrepancies in the provisions of French transposition laws were contrary to the spirit of the directive, and although France aimed to increase protection for victims, 46 this nonetheless violated EU law, as establishing a "level playing field" 47 was the rationale underlying the PL Directive. 48 Therefore, EU harmonization law holds that inclusion of the DRD in a national legal panorama is optional, but that whenever a member state chooses to do so, adherence to its spirit (and conditions) must be quite total although interpretative flexibility is a tool explicitly recognized by national courts. Disharmony in the law addressing tainted blood, for example, 49 may well be explained by the divergent approaches of the civil and common law to judicial discourse. 50 Nonetheless, the limits of such flexibility remain to be defined. 44 PL Directive, supra note 5 at 29. 45 Commission v France, supra note 40 at I-3867. 46 See Whittaker, supra note 9 at 450ff. 47 The paradigm is widely referred to in product liability scholarship: see e.g. van 
B. Of National Clones, Mutants, and Hybrids
In a German case that addressed personal injury caused by an exploding glass bottle (the Mineralwasserflasche case), 51 for example, the Bundesgerichtshof held that the DRD does not apply to manufacturing defects, as [w] hen the EC Directive on product liability was being fashioned it was agreed that the defence under art. 7 (e) should apply not to manufacturing defects, but only to defects of design and construction ... and the only dangers emanating from a product which the German legislator wished to exempt from the scope of the Product Liability Law were dangers, undetectable even with the exercise of all possible care, arising at the stage of design and construction. 52 The court observed that the company's bottle control system was inadequate despite that it may well have been "the best possible machinery." 53 In fact, the court held that increased quality control by visual inspection could contribute to preventing the harm caused by ausreisser (isolated defective goods in the production line) and therefore insisted that the defect is specific to the individual product. 54 The judgment ultimately ruled in favour of the plaintiffs, anchoring its conclusion on the general principle of defect-based liability. 55 Other member states availed themselves of the PL Directive's discretionary window (a compromise clearly designed to satisfy public opinion), thereby depicting dissimilar scenarios in light of the very nature of the in- 53 Ibid at para 2. 54 See ibid. The court's reasoning relies upon the technical explanation of the cause of the defect. Be it attributable to a hairline crack, the defence would apply as the risk was undiscoverable; be it a chipped area, conversely, it was discoverable and as such would not trigger the defence: see Mildred, supra note 9 at 171. However, the court further seems to merge these issues, as it indistinctively concludes that "[t]he evidence shows that the explosion which damaged the plaintiff was due either to a chip or to a hairline crack, both of which are defects under 3 of the Product Liability Law" (Mineralwasserflasche, supra note 51 at para 2 [emphasis added]). , he was well aware of the German Mineralwasserflasche case, and to some degree borrowed the narrow interpretation of the DRD that the Bundesgerichtshof had proposed. Using slightly different vocabulary, Justice Burton established a dichotomy between standard and non-standard products in order to distinguish those that are manufactured according to their specifications from others (i.e., "lemons" or defective products) to which the DRD does not apply (see ibid at para 36).
volved products. Because of these ad hoc responses to nationalsometimes highly localized-consumer product crises (thalidomide, wine, oil, etc.), some products remain outside the DRD's field of application today, including medicines in Germany; 56 foodstuffs in Spain; 57 or, in France, blood products and body parts. 58 The result is an unappealing, compartmentalized structure within liability law, which has shrunk, expanded, twirled, and been eradicated to the rhythm of political and moral sentiments, often oblivious to a principle that should-in my opinion 59 Much uncertainty remains regarding the application of the defence, 66 and it is still unclear whether it applies to contractual liability. 67 The defence has clearly not been adopted in section 53 of Quebec's Consumer Protection Act, which allows victims to recover based on strict liability, as "[t]he merchant or the manufacturer shall not plead that he was unaware of the defect or lack of instructions." 68 Finally, some states never seriously considered adopting the DRD (e.g., Finland and Luxembourg); others have been unenthusiastic about judge-made product liability schemes to begin with (such as most Canadian common law provinces, 69 which tend to opt for the state-of-the-art standard that is better suited to the catch-all tort of negligence 70 ). Moreover and by reason of a constitutional interference (pre-emption 71 ), American victims are prevented altogether from initiating actions based on fail- ure to warn (information defect) when it comes to certain products (e.g., medical devices and tobacco products). 72
II. Knowledge or Uncertainty? The Methodology Maze
As already mentioned, the premise underlying the DRD is surprisingly simple. Overly broad liability chills innovation, threatens to make certain products entirely unavailable, and increases insurance premiums. To avoid these negative effects, the DRD aims to strike an acceptable compromise. It reintroduces the "knowledge variable" that is usually excluded by strict product liability schemes, which focus on product defects, evoking common law dialectics between foreseeable and unforeseeable, avoidable and unavoidable. Accordingly, producers of defective goods are legally excused if insufficient scientific knowledge was available at the time the product was commercialized. Recent product liability scholarship has distilled a two-prong DRD test out of the knowledge element and the discovery variables, which gives rise to a sui generis, EU-style product liability regime, distinct from the American approach. 73 Although helpful, this framework raises four difficult questions that will undoubtedly require judicial clarifications. First (Subsection A), how accessible must the knowledge be? Second (Subsection B), who must it be available to, and what criteria should be used to evaluate it? Third (Subsection C), how should the ethical questions be addressed that arise whenever producers of goods generate knowledge regarding the very products they put on the market? Finally (Subsection D), how should novel or marginal scientific opinions be evaluated?
A. The Domain of Knowledge: Existing Data and Accessibility
Although still scarce, recent comparative case law analysis has shed light on a possibility to avoid liability rooted in "scientific and technical" knowledge, and, by implication, the producer's capacity to avoid risks. Knowledge entails two conditions: that relevant data indeed exists, and that it be accessible to the producer. The least worrying concern is accessibility, which may now be moot due to the proliferation of online databases and search engines (e.g., open access services, Google Scholar, etc.) and the hegemony of the English language within academia and the scientific community. Accessibility refers to the potential to identify the results of technical and R&D studies. By 1997, a well-known ECJ case 74 Existing data refers to scientific information surrounding a given risk, founded on sources such as trials or experiments whose results are exposed and discussed in scholarly publications. A wide interpretation of the text of article 7(e) suggests that producers ought to know every scientific result, in every relevant technical or scientific field, that could enable them to discover the defect. This heavy informational burden has been criticized by invoking a hypothetical "lucky" plaintiff who "turn[s] up information from a totally unexpected field" 76 which precludes the defendant from availing himself of the DRD.
At least in Germany, the impossibility of improving a product due to lack of scientific knowledge is no defence to liability when, though unavoidable, a risk is known to the producer. This conclusion was reached by the Bundesgerichtshof in a seminal German case 77 that held that the explosion of a glass bottle containing mineral water does not fall within the scope of the development risk exemption, as such risk is known to producers. The court seemingly shifted its focus away from the defect toward the risk of harm itself. Although there were no technical means available to prevent the (rare) occurrence of this risk, the court stuck to a narrow interpretation of the knowledge element and discarded the arguments the defendant had put forward to exclude himself from liability. These thoughts echoed in London when Justice Burton, apparently seduced by the Germanic argument, held in the context of contaminated blood litigation that
[i]t would, in my judgment, be inconsistent with the purpose of the directive if a producer, in the case of a known risk, continues to supply products simply because, and despite the fact that, he is unable 75 See ibid at I-2659. See also A and others, supra note 55 at paras 47-49. to identify in which if any of his products that defect will occur or recur. 78 Seemingly, the boundaries of the DRD are interpreted narrowly, thereby confining the scope of an exoneration clause that seems at odds with the risk distribution rationale that underlies product liability.
B. The "Whom" Question
Another of the most critical issues was articulated by Newdick: "[T]o whom ought that information be available before it may be described as 'discoverable'?" 79 Is knowledge to be evaluated in light of subjective or objective criteria? The "whose knowledge?" question was at the core of Commission v UK. 80 In their transplant of the PL Directive, English legislators adopted a formulation of the supranational instrument that rejected key features of the DRD. In their place, the UK substituted an assessment of scientific knowledge from the standpoint of "a producer of products of the same description as the product in question" 81 (i.e., the producer's perspective). The UK provision uses the language of negligence: reference to classes of producers suggests reasonableness, objective standards, and other porous terms well known to common lawyers. 82 Despite this clear disparity in the wording of the provisions, the ECJ came to the conclusion that the action introduced by the Commission was premature, given that UK courts might still interpret the PL Directive's section 7(e) national clone in conformity with EU law. According to Attorney General Tesauro, however, this knowledge standard is "not concerned with the practices and safety standards in use in the industrial sector in which the producer is operating." 83 As a result of the above-mentioned criterion, knowledge needs to be apprehended in light of a twin notion: that of discoverability, which in turn leads to the labyrinth of causation. 84 78 A and others, supra note 55 at para 74. 79 Newdick, supra note 76 at 310. Discoverability purports to establish the elusive link between knowledge and proof of a defect-the trail of breadcrumbs-allowing an inference that an improper R&D process caused the defect. While knowledge may be described as a bundle of objective information, discoverability refers to a manufacturer's intellectual capacity to assemble the pieces of the puzzle to "enable the existence of the defect to be discovered." 85 The key word is likely the verb "enable"-meaning permit 86 -which, despite lending itself to varying interpretations, clearly introduces a subjective element into the evaluation of the DRD. The question becomes whether, aside from dissenting or isolated opinions (discussed below), the knowledge available was such as to allow, scientifically speaking, the producer to discover the defect. Did he have the benefit of the interdisciplinary knowledge of a scientific, technical team 87 or rather consciously handpick from available information in a teleological fashion? In this context, evaluation of a producer's behaviour may discover a partial merging of the DRD and the state-of-the-art defence.
Evaluation of the safety of everyday products usually calls for knowledge of technical standards (e.g., ISO, CEN, DIN). Assessing products with significant R&D cycles often entails the difficult task of combining two or more data sources. Airplanes may today be faster, safer, and ever more comfortable due to advances in metal alloys, physics, thermal radiation, electronic devices, meteorological science, etc. Would all this knowledge preclude the DRD, say, in the context of the Air France flight 447 accident over Brazil? Was Airbus capable of anticipating the risk of data distortion due to the presence of ice crystals in its airspeed measurement device, despite the fact that "[t]he obstruction of the Pitot probes by ice crystals during cruise was a phenomenon that was known but misunderstood by the aviation community at the time of the accident"? 88 In the case of experimental products-excepting GMOs, drugs, and medical devices-there might be little, contradicting, or no knowledge at all. Of- ten, producers generate their own knowledge through the R&D they directly carry on or sponsor. They might know that a particular molecule cures a pathology, but remain unaware of its effects when combined with another. In such cases, does the "enabling" factor refer to the methodological capacity of the producer to gather sufficient knowledge (and if so, to what extent?), or is discoverability to be ascertained through existing knowledge stemming, say, from clinical trials? There is evidence of the discoverability loop in the thalidomide story, as the trials conducted on animals had failed to prove the drug's toxicity. Rats did not metabolize the drug, and it was assumed the same would be true for humans, but this was ultimately true of many tests in which extrapolation of animal to human response is impossible. 89 In such circumstances the producer did not have knowledge, and thus, the DRD appears to apply, leaving victims without compensation. An alternative approach is to suggest that the producer was in fact able to discover the defect, had it combined the result of these trials (knowledge) with proper human clinical trials (discoverability).
In other words, what are the effects of traces or partial knowledge on the discoverability variable? Barker et al. ask the right question:
[W]hat if there is some evidence that the product may have been defective but the causal connection has not been established according to the usual scientific methods used to determine whether use of a product can cause a particular side effect (and hence be defective as not being as safe as persons generally are entitled to expect)? 90 They add: "Can the [DRD] apply to a supply of the drug at the time the potential risk was discovered but before it had been established whether the risk was a real risk? It appears that it can." 91 Until now, case law has remained focused on knowledge, neglecting discoverability. Nonetheless, a Dutch case handed down in the sensitive context of contaminated blood concluded that the DRD applied in the following context. 92 The plaintiff contracted HIV during the famous window period in which detection is impossible (that is, the period between the moment of infection and the actual development of HIV detectable antibodies); so that the risk, hence, was unavoidable. The court of first instance held that the blood supplier had acted in light of technological and scientific knowledge at the time of the transfusion. Was the defect discoverable with the help of proper research and development (and funding)? The court never really asked that question, as it rather relied on the consumer expectation test: "the general public is entitled to expect that blood products in the Netherlands have been 100% HIV-free for some time." 93 Moving away from the prevailing objective criteria that the landmark case A and others had advocated, the Dutch case, precisely through the door left open by the discoverability element, seems to reintroduce the possibility of American-inspired interpretations.
Discoverability gains further force when the producer is capable of setting its own development risk boundaries through corporate strategies. Bureaucracies do not repeat R&D already carried out in laboratories and universities. Once invited to release a market authorization, for example, national regulators (e.g., Health Canada) and supranational agencies (e.g., European Medicines Agency, the Food and Drug Administration) evaluate the methodology that underlies scientific knowledge. Technocrats analyze the exactitude of scientific correlations between variables to assess the risks and potential benefits. However, the formulation of hypotheses and even the very selection of appropriate variables, through protocols, are among the prerogatives of the researchers, who will decide-whenever economically feasible 94 -what will be studied 95 in order to meet the regulators' requirements. Ironically enough, it may not be in a producer's best interest to know too much-including pharmacogenomic effects 96 -as too much knowledge could lead to the exclusion of the DRD, and, consequently, expose producers to liability. A group of Australian au- 94 See Goldberg, Causation and Risk, supra note 3 at 230. 95 The producer is not alone in this task, as ethics committees and international standards exist to "help" carry out the research ethically. Nonetheless, the standards ("best practices") and approval processes have more to do with the research materials and subjects than the parameters. See e.g. US, National Commission for 96 For an explanation of pharmacogenomics, see Richard Weinshilboum, "Inheritance and Drug Response" (2003) 348:6 New Eng J Med 529 (explaining that "[a]s our knowledge of genetic variations in proteins involved in the uptake, distribution, metabolism, and action of various drugs improves, our ability to test for that variation and, as a result, to select the best drug at the optimal dose for each patient should also increase" at 536).
thors accordingly note this "incentive for a defendant not to conduct the necessary further testing to establish the causal connection, although the failure to do so may well amount to common law negligence." 97
Commenting on the UK blood contamination case A and others, 98 another author formulated similar comments, emphasizing that
[o]ne issue which was left unclear by Burton J's judgment is whether the conduct of the producer, particularly in relation to efforts to discover the relative safety of a product by comparing it with another, is to be taken into account when assessing the discoverability of the defect. 99 Although this would have properly addressed the discoverability issue, scrutinizing safety testing amounts to reintroducing fault into the product liability dialectic, and would certainly expand the length and complexity of trials, which strict liability sought, in the wake of the 1970s, precisely to circumvent.
A single example will suffice to illustrate these difficulties. In the recent 222-page Canadian common law negligence case Andersen v. St. Jude Medical, 100 the safety of heart valves coated with Silzone was the object of a class action after some patients suffered thromboembolic complications. Designed and manufactured by the defendant, the medical device had been authorized for distribution and sale in Canada in 1997. 101 After being regularly implanted in patients beginning in September 1997, a voluntary recall of the valves was issued on 21 January 2000. A clinical trial carried on while the device was on the market-under the name AVERT 102 -had brought to light "a small, but statistically significant in- The decision captured the spirit of many-if not all-actions involving defective products:
While it would be naïve to think that the company was unconcerned about profits or protecting its intellectual property, no valve manufacturer would be in business very long if it neglected patient safety and marketed products that didn't work. 105 The crux of the case materializes in the key issue surrounding the allegation of a design defect, which the court summarizes by asking whether "a Silzone coating on a mechanical heart valve [put] patients at a materially increased risk of experiencing one or more ... complications." 106 The court answered this question negatively, holding that the plaintiffs did not establish that the defendants failed to exercise a reasonable degree of care in the pre-market design and testing or in the post-market surveillance of Silzone-coated products that would be expected of a reasonable and prudent prosthetic heart valve manufacturer in similar circumstances. 107 More specifically, the plaintiffs had argued that although the defendant St. Jude appears to have sought regulatory approval of its Silzonecoated valve despite gaps in knowledge about its clinical effectiveness: 114 cautionary labelling reflected the strategic step-by-step approach taken by the defendant. The plaintiff believed the coated valve offered no greater benefit than another one already marketed by the same defendant. On this issue, the court held that the risk utility test does not require defendants to assess whether the benefits of the Silzone valve outweighed the benefits of the conventional valve relative to their risks. Rather, it was required to consider whether the potential benefits associated with the addition of Silzone outweighed the potential risks of Silzone. 115 Methodologically, the court confined the analysis to the device itself, shifting away from the American idea suggesting that product comparison and tests may include those to assess the physical, chemical, biological and mechanical properties of heart valve substitutes and of their materials and components [in addition to] those for pre-clinical in vivo evaluation and clinical evaluation of the finished heart valve substitute.
safer alternatives be at the heart of asserting defectiveness. Accordingly, in the eyes of the court "the conventional valve did not meet the same need as the Silzone valve because it did not address the risk of [prosthetic valve endocarditis]." 116 Through these lenses, the coated valve brought about distinct risks, and different benefits, as "PVE was a known risk with the conventional valve that the Silzone valve had the potential to address." 117 The case was therefore dismissed.
In the UK, scholarship suggests that "industry practice is less relevant than industry capability, or the potential for greater safety, in judging whether a 'state of the art' defence is made out." 118 Albeit stringent, the hybrid nature of such a position appears more satisfactory, as some objectiveness in the criteria allows judges to leave aside dubious corporate choices designed to avoid specific risk testing. 119 From a conceptual point of view, though, asserting the centrality of such a paradigm may well amount to merging, as was already mentioned, the DRD with the distinct state-of-the-art defence and vocabulary.
D. Eppur si muove ... (Thou Shall Dissent)
This raises a final question, as R&D is largely advanced by initially marginal scientific voices: Were Galileo and Copernicus aware of the close intimacy between dissent and heresy? What are the "weight" and relevance of dissent and isolated scientific opinions? In his submission to the ECJ in Commission v. UK, Attorney General Tesauro rightly pointed out that "the progress of scientific culture does not develop linearly in so far as new studies and new discoveries may initially be criticized and regarded as unreliable by most of the scientific community, yet"-he added-"subsequently after the passage of time undergo an opposite process of 'beatification' whereby they are virtually unanimously endorsed." 120 In sum, "the significant biochemical disturbances and physiological failures documented in this work confirm the pathological effects of these GMO and R treatments in both sexes, with different amplitudes." 125 Many scientists fiercely opposed these results, arguing that the type of rats used in the study was predisposed to tumours, and that the statistical evidence presented was inconclusive. 126 These methodological gaps therefore allegedly contaminated the experiment and gave rise to results that-despite being subjected to appropriate peer review-were not scientifically sound. 127 found within the scientific community, it is even more elusive to legal experts, who are intellectually ill equipped to second-guess scientists' methodological choices and tactics. In such matters, speculation is always at best tentative and at worst empty rhetoric. From a legal standpoint, then, what can possibly be done in the face of such scientific polemics? Coderch and Puig anticipated the problem triggered by "uncertain science" that may nonetheless influence the amount and quality of knowledge 128 for the purpose of making findings on a balance of probabilities. 129 Quite predictably, the debate leads to the junk science-good science dialectic, which underlies the landmark American case of Daubert, 130 as the criteria embedded in the DRD invite analysis of the scientific evidence presented by expert witnesses (whether appointed by the court or hired by the parties). 131 In a different context, the Australian decision in Peterson v. Merck Sharp & Dohme 132 was a pharmaceutical consumer class action involving the drug Vioxx. The court held in that case that the drug's side effects were not sufficiently known to the producer so as to constitute scientific knowledge. The drug had been approved around 1999 by regulators but was withdrawn from the market in the fall of 2004 after a study revealed that its side effects included doubling the risk of adverse cardiovascular events. 133 A year later, the federal appeals division, known as the Full Court, rejected the imposition of a duty to warn on the defendant Merck toward the plaintiff of risks of heart disease, as scientific and technical knowledge was inconclusive. 134 Indeed, the result of one study made available in March 2000 named VIGOR was held insufficient to establish scientific knowledge, hence allowing recourse to the DRD, in force in section 142 of the Australian Consumer Law. 135 Can this debate on the place of dissenting science be further nourished by scholarship in international trade law? The temptation is great, as minority opinions have caught the attention of WTO arbitrators in their interpretation of the Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Agreement, 136 and specifically determining the quality of scientific expertise underlying SPS measures adopted or maintained by member states. Article 2(1) of the SPS Agreement provides that such measures may be undertaken if "necessary for the protection of human, animal or plant life or health." All such SPS measures must be "based on scientific principles and [shall not be] maintained without sufficient scientific evidence." 137 In interpreting this provision, the WTO appellate body has mentioned that risk assessment is not bound by any "monolithic conclusion" of majoritarian scientific opinion, as these may hide the uncertainty within the community. 138 Nonetheless, SPS measures still must meet the "sufficiency" criterion 139 by demonstrating "the existence of a sufficient or adequate relationship no warnings had been given that the drug may cause the side effect" (Barker et al, supra note 90 at 655 [emphasis added]). If knowledge was lacking, how could the producer have disclosed the unknown risks to consumers through proper warnings? Liability, though, had instead been found on the basis of contractual warranty, as the court of first instance had held that Vioxx was not reasonably fit for its purpose and was not of merchantable quality as it did not meet consumers' expectations that arthritic pain medication should not double the risk of heart attack. Insights might also be gleaned, mutatis mutandis, from the duty to warn, as the underlying problem is similar: where a producer acquires knowledge of a risk of harm to consumers, that producer must take action to inform consumers of the risk (by modifying the product, recalling it, or withdrawing it from the market). Though this obligation may not always be statutory, it undoubtedly influences the distinction between negligence and strict liability.
between two elements, in casu, between the SPS measure and the scientific evidence." 140 The wording of the DRD probably opens the door to similar questions that flow from the definition of "scientific and technical knowledge" contained at article 7(e) of the PL Directive. A last, intriguing question will be left unexplored: To what extent does "science" include the humanities, epidemiology, or metaphysics?
Conclusion
The effects of the DRD on product liability are twofold. First, it predictably sends victims back to the labyrinth of fault-based liability (or other relevant causes of action) and invites them to search out other defendants. Focusing on different elements of the DRD may result in a more or less subjective analysis. Insisting that efforts could have been made by an industry to discover a defect, to carry on further research, etc., saddles plaintiffs with a burden that the directive seemingly sought to lift. As Howells and Mildred suggest, this situation is explained by the political compromise that was reached in the PL Directive. Even if it comes at the cost of further fractioning the interior market, flexibility as to the strictness of liability may well be available to member states willing to exercise their discretion. In this regard, strict liability and fault-based liability advocates will each long persist within the world of product liability, accompanied by "third-way" 141 proponents of hybrid solutions.
Second, the policy reasons underlying the exoneration clause have always been economic in nature: too much liability is said to chill innovation. However, little tangible proof of the correlation has been presented in empirical research. Ironically enough, although this aspect of the DRD merits further study, its proponents have never really been bothered by the lack of evidence surrounding the argument's foundation in the alleged "chilling effect". Indeed, one study conducted at the European Commission's request remains utterly prudent in establishing such a cause-effect relationship. 142 A qualitative analysis was also carried out by the Fondazione Rosselli to illustrate the impact of the DRD on product liability. Published in 2004, the study cautiously concluded that it can be said that the [DRD] has had the merit of providing industry with a clear-cut reference for evaluating product safety. At the same time, there is no evidence that the absence of the [DRD] in specific countries and/or industries have significantly hindered innovation. 143 Indeed, participating companies 144 expressed the sentiment that if the DRD were to disappear, they would simply invest in more comprehensive insurance coverage or would deploy additional efforts to better assess the safety of their products. 145 There is a clear contradiction between this indifference toward the DRD on the part of economic actors and alarmism about its demise. 146 The shallowness of the rationale of chilling innovation probably explains the polarized positions found in contemporary scholarship and case law.
However, antibodies are present in most states' veins that may allow them to ward off the DRD by allowing plaintiffs to institute their action on other grounds. 147 Somewhat by default, negligence, faute, and all of their variations have historically formed the basis of personal injury law, but have long been considered inadequate bases on which to ground compensation for damage caused by innovative products. 148 Nonetheless, it is to be anticipated that the costs and the uncertainty associated with such actions will render them decreasingly effective, as proof of negligence requires scientific evidence that is often outside the reach of plaintiffs. Pharmaceutical litigation, for example, revolves around a two-part strategy, which consists of proving a failure in product safety evaluation before the products' introduction into the market and establishing a further failure to warn health professionals (in case of prescription drugs) or consumers (for over-the-counter medicines) of a risk. Proof of causation can also turn cases into fora for scientific debate, 149 as the waltz of variables endlessly shifts according to new hypotheses, theorems, deductions, and assumptions. Such an endeavour requires expert examination of the methodology and protocols underlying clinical trials and often involves a level of complexity that materializes in extended hearings.
Ultimately the benefit of the DRD lies not so much in its actual results for producers, but rather in the enrichment of judicial discourse through the use of comparative legal approaches that increase the circulation of ideas and solutions available within courtrooms. 
